

CGIAR's Governance and Organizational Structure— Lessons from History¹

Selcuk Ozgediz

This note provides a summary of the past proposals made for reforming the governance of the CGIAR since the expansion of the CGIAR in 1990. The proposals are covered under three headings:

- governance of the CGIAR System as a whole, i.e., how the Consultative Group makes its decisions and how it is organized to facilitate its decision-making;
- organizational structure of the CGIAR's "operating arm," i.e., how the institutions and programs that conduct research and research-related activities relate to each other and to the Consultative Group; and,
- governance of the individual institutions (Centers) and programs (Challenge Programs) that make up the "operating arm" of the System.

This breakdown allows analyzing governance question at each level of the System, in isolation from the other levels. Analyzing governance of the CGIAR System separately allows examining it as a donor coordination mechanism, irrespective of what it supports (as if it could be health research, HIV AIDS work, energy innovations, etc.) This approach also facilitates comparisons with the governance models of other multi-donor platforms.

One implication of the framework used in studying the reform proposals is that the same reform attempt is examined from three different angles, to the extent that the reform involves recommendations at the System governance, organizational structure and Center governance levels. Thus, there is some overlap in the studies covered in Tables 1, 2, and 3.

Reforming CGIAR's Governance

Table 1 provides a history of major attempts at reforming the CGIAR's governance, including the actions taken by the CGIAR on the proposals made and my personal observations on the reasons for the action or inaction. This telescopic look shows that the past reform proposals have focused on one or more of the following dimensions of System governance:

1. ***Legal status of the CGIAR.*** The conventional wisdom in the CGIAR has been in favor of remaining as an informal organization. Although the Third System Review (TSR) in 1998 and the OED Meta Evaluation in 2003 recommended incorporation as a legal entity, the membership has not been convinced of the added value of changing its legal status. A key reason is that informality enables member representatives to

¹ Prepared as background for the Working Group on Governance, 2008 CGIAR Change Management exercise.

take positions in CGIAR meetings without consultation with their home institutions. This feature enables the CGIAR to make decisions by consensus.

2. ***Organization of the Consultative Group.*** During its first 20 years, the CGIAR operated essentially as a committee-of-the-whole, with the exception of using some *ad hoc* committees or task forces from time to time. This changed in 1993 with the formation of two standing committees (on Oversight and Finance). The trend continued in 1995 with the addition of another advisory committee (on Impact Assessment), complementing the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), and two partnership committees (Private Sector and NGO Committees). The addition of three more committees (Steering Committee [which was later called “Consultative Council”], Genetic Resources Policy Committee and a Science Partnership Committee) in the late 1990s added to the complexity of the Consultative Group’s organizational structure.

Some streamlining took place following the work of the CDMT in 2001. The most important development here was the establishment of an Executive Council (ExCo). Coupled with the elimination of the Mid-Term Meeting of the CGIAR, ExCo became the central body for coordinating the CGIAR’s governance and oversight functions. Transforming TAC into a Science Council was another change that emerged from the CDMT, but, in reality, this did not affect to a significant degree the nature of the science advice the CGIAR received.

3. ***CGIAR’s business practices.*** Although it is not a formal organization, the CGIAR functions as if it is one. A recent example is the adoption of a Charter. Other examples cover the full gamut of practices in functional areas. Several of the past reform proposals involved strengthening one aspect or another of CGIAR’s business practices (such as strengthening impact assessment following the Lucerne meeting, introducing a separate Business Meeting of the CGIAR at the AGMs as a result of the CDMT, introducing a performance measurement system during the most recent Reform Program, updating of the CGIAR guidelines on finance and center governance on a regular basis, etc.)
4. ***CGIAR’s support structure.*** This includes primarily the CGIAR Secretariat and the Science Council Secretariat. The formation of a System Office following the CDMT attempted to bring under one roof these two Secretariats plus all other units that provide services to the “operating arm” of the System, including the Alliance Office. The jury is still out on this experiment because it is not clear if it has led to meaningful integration of all intended services and functions—perhaps except for the corporate communication function.

The System Office concept derived its logic from the need to have all corporate support functions integrated, initially loosely through a virtual System Office. Some of these functions are necessary for smooth operation of the Consultative Group and its committees. Others are needed to support the Centers as a collectivity. And some functions serve both the Centers and the Consultative Group (such as the

communication function mentioned above.)

Observers of the CGIAR's institutional history often ask why there are two secretariats and a separate Alliance Office. Couldn't these be combined under one roof?

The response usually goes like this: As the Science Council is independent, having a dedicated secretariat protects the Council's independence. Secondly, as the Centers are recipients of funds from the donors and are accountable to them, there needs to be a firewall between the services provided to the donors and the centers. (In fact, this was one of the reasons for the objection of some Members to the Federation concept developed by the Centers in 2000.)

5. ***CGIAR's corporate governance functions.*** These could be grouped under the following headings²:
- a. *Corporate planning and priority setting*
 - b. *Review of program plans and budgets from operating units (including support structure)*
 - c. *Allocation of resources to operating units*
 - d. *Monitoring the implementation of agreed operational plans*
 - e. *Evaluation of performance of operating units*
 - f. *Corporate finance and resource mobilization*
 - g. *Corporate communication*
 - h. *Corporate appointments*
 - i. *Conducting CGIAR and committee meetings.*

Several of the past reforms focused on improving the performance of these functions. From the first study noted in Table 1 (on deliberation and decision making processes) to the last (OED Meta Evaluation), all commented on one aspect or another of these functions. The Annex to the first note I prepared for the WG lists most of these functions along with the roles and responsibilities of the System units in carrying them out.

The CGIAR has been paying closer attention to its governance performance since the establishment of the Oversight Committee 15 years ago, which is a role carried out by ExCo now.

Concluding Comments on CGIAR Governance

Three of the CGIAR's commonly cited four governance principles relate to the issues covered above. These are: (1) donor sovereignty; (2) consensus decision making (which is sometimes called "informality"); and, (3) independent technical advice.³ It would be

² There are other ways these functions could be classified. I focused here on functions that are currently performed in the CGIAR.

³ The fourth principle (center autonomy) relates to the "operating arm" of the System.

useful for WG3 to review these three principles as it explores further reforms of System governance.

The first of these, *donor sovereignty*, mainly refers to how donors currently make their financial contributions. This principle would clearly need to be revisited if there is a different funding arrangement that reduces the autonomy donors enjoy at the moment. This means that WG3's System governance related recommendations need to be closely aligned with WG4's recommendations on funding.

Consensus decision making is a byproduct of the CGIAR's status as an unincorporated, informal organization. While making decisions by consensus is a tall order challenge for any organization, in the CGIAR's case, this principle has actually helped keep the donor community together. There are other advantages as well as disadvantages of consensus decision making. These will need to be re-examined during the Change Management process.

As far as legal status is concerned, although the CGIAR itself does not have a legal personality, its support units do: the CGIAR Secretariat as a department of the World Bank (with autonomy in its internal affairs), the Science Council Secretariat as a unit of FAO (also with autonomy in its internal affairs), and the Alliance Office as a part of IFAD.

Finally, the CGIAR's need for *independent advice* on scientific and technical matters was recognized from Day 1 at the time of the System's establishment in 1971. Over the years the CGIAR discussions on TAC and SC have focused on their size, composition, terms-of-reference, etc.—but not on their existence. Whether this view would hold in the future depends on what the CGIAR does in the future, what kind of decisions it makes, and the need it has for independent scientific advice. Most cues on this are expected to come from WG1 and from WG3's work on the organizational structure of the “operational arm” of the System.

Reforming the CGIAR's Organizational Structure

A close examination of the CGIAR's handling of organizational structure matters (summarized in Table 2) shows that this issue has always been a “hot potato” for the System, no one wanting to handle it. And when someone actually has ventured a thought or recommendation, the System has always found a reason not to consider or pursue it.

The first major restructuring scenario was developed by TAC in 1993-94, at the request of the CGIAR, when the system was experiencing a financial crisis and restructuring the Centers was seen as the only viable response. Leadership change in 1994 moved the goalposts from shrinking the System to expanding its resource base. Therefore, the TAC recommendations on restructuring never saw the light of day.

The next set of recommendations on structure had a similar fate. Neither the Conway Panel report (which laid out a vision to move towards a program-based approach) nor the Oversight Committee paper (which raised a single board or a divisionalized structure as two ways to move towards more centralized management of the Centers) received much attention. At the time the System was focused on improving stability, and restructuring would certainly be a destabilizing move.

The Third System Review bypassed the structure issue (suggesting that a separate management study should be conducted on it). Seeing a leadership vacuum on the issue, the Centers came up with the idea of forming a federation, which would create a platform for collective action while maintaining the autonomy of each Center. The Federation proposal took the restructuring issue off the table for a while, but when the proposal was not supported by the CGIAR, restructuring was put back on the table (for a Change Design and Management Team to handle.)

This time it was the CDMT that took the restructuring question off the table, arguing that the reforms it recommended (such as moving to a programmatic approach through challenge programs) would induce restructuring of the Centers over time (through the marketplace). However, the marketplace was not inclined towards *mergers and acquisitions* (at least until now), despite the incentives offered by the CGIAR.

The CGIAR came to a stark realization of how the existing structure was leading to disjointed action on the ground in Sub-Saharan Africa during the discussion of the ICRISAT external review and the plans for re-organizing the ISNAR Program. This had been a too-well known phenomenon by the CGIAR's NARS partners in SSA, who, for years, had been urging the System to streamline its organization so that they (NARS) would not have to confront so many different research organizations at the same time.

In a true CGIAR fashion, the System acted by forming two Task Forces to help with the alignment issue in SSA, only to realize that handling structure in a piecemeal manner (or region by region) would not lead to a solution acceptable to all.

This is where the System finds itself in 2008, with no consensus solution to the organizational structure issue in hand, but with a determined effort to address it head-on during the Change Management Initiative.

What Worked in the Past and Why

The System went through a partial re-organization in 1993, when four Centers were merged into two, and in 2004 when one Center was closed, with some of its programs transferred to another Center. In each case:

- *There was a compelling rationale.* In the ILCA-ILRAD merger, the declining funding for livestock research reduced the viability of maintaining two separate Centers. In the case of INIBAP, the newly admitted network/center was too small to remain as a separate unit. In the case of ISNAR it was the performance problems that prompted action by the CGIAR.

- *There was relatively strong consensus within the CGIAR for the action taken.* In some cases it took some time for the consensus to develop. Either the CG Chair or committee (like the Oversight Committee or ExCo) or some individual Members took the lead in building the consensus.
- *The CGIAR entrusted a task force or working group to explore the options in detail.* Usually led by a CG Member, the TF approach enabled interaction with all key stakeholders, as well as helping build consensus around a common solution.

The introduction of Challenge Programs was another structural change in the operational arm of the CGIAR. This, too, was possible because of the effort made to develop a strong rationale for a programmatic approach, support from the CGIAR leadership and some Members who favored a programmatic approach, and the financial backing offered by the World Bank.

By implication, the ideas and proposals that did not go forward were either:

- untimely (something more important was going on);
- not well argued (just suggested options but were not specific enough for people to see the consequences);
- involved a re-distribution of power (there were some winners and some losers);
- not fully backed by the CGIAR leadership; or,
- they were resisted by the Centers and their supporters, including the host countries.⁴

Restructuring Options

Organizational structure ideas proposed in the past always started with a prior assumption on *what the CGIAR would be supporting*. There were three lines of thought:

- *CGIAR should support programs, themes or challenges.* Under this argument there would be no “franchised” CGIAR institutions. CGIAR’s aim would be to support high priority initiatives through appropriate consortia and networks. The challenge programs come close to this line of thought. Also, depending on their definition, programs could be led by some of the existing Centers, giving them a privileged position in the running of an agreed program.
- *CGIAR should support research centers or institutions whose work is devoted fully to CGIAR’s high priority themes.* This was the starting assumption of structure discussions in the CGIAR until about mid-1990s. The TAC restructuring study was one of the first attempts to re-configure the center system through mergers.

⁴ An example for the host country reaction is the strong opposition of the CGIAR Member from India to the recommendation of the external review of ICRISAT to move the Center’s headquarters to Africa.

- *CGIAR should support both programs and institutions, depending on what instrument makes the most sense for a given objective.* The Conway Panel's recommendations were along this line, arguing that some agreed long-term CGIAR programs could best be carried out through centers (e.g., in the area of germplasm conservation and enhancement). The CDMT also saw co-existence of programs and Centers as healthy for the CGIAR in the long term.

As the CGIAR is currently following the third line of thought (supporting both programs and institutions), and because the idea of providing support only to institutions is no longer viable in the CGIAR, the choices for the future appear to be between the first and the third options. Clarity on this issue is expected to emerge from the work of WG1.

With these prior assumptions in mind, the structural options considered in the past essentially fell into three groups:

- *Decentralized governance approach.* This is essentially along the lines of the *status quo*. CGIAR operational units (centers or programs) would be autonomous, but accountable to the CGIAR—however it is organized to exercise its oversight. The Federation and the Alliance models are variants of this approach because the constituent units in a federation model maintain their autonomy and power in all vital matters.
- *Centralized governance approach.* Often referred to as the “single board model” or the “corporate governance approach,” under this option the authority to manage the operational arm of the System (both Centers and CPs) would be vested in a central board. Each operating unit would report to this board. Operating units may have small boards of management appointed by the central board.
- *Partially-centralized governance approach.* This option reflects a point between the centralized and decentralized models. Past studies referred to it as the “divisionalized structure” or the “cluster model.” Essentially, the option groups existing operating units and programs under a few boards, each board managing several units and/or programs. Like in the centralized model, operating units would report to the “cluster” or “division” board and may each have small boards of management appointed by the cluster board. The clusters could be along thematic, functional or regional lines (or a combination).

Concluding Comments on Organizational Structure

All of the successful re-organizations that took place in the past were top-down, backed with strong rationale. There were no successful bottom-up mergers or reorganizations that changed the power structure—even when incentives were offered. This may be seen as a positive sign, in the sense that there is no serious crisis affecting the operational arm

of the System that is pushing the Centers towards consolidation. Each operating unit is quite successful, as evidenced by their performance records, and, under such circumstances, none would volunteer to be “restructured.” In short, despite the challenges faced in many fronts, life appears to be good at the level of each operating unit.⁵

This means that any restructuring proposal should provide strong and convincing rationale to modify the status quo. A strong business case has to be made to suggest any restructuring. Part of this would have to be on strategic/programmatic grounds and part on efficiency. Efficiency alone would not be sufficient. Above all, the operating units would need to be convinced that life could be even better under a different arrangement!

The past restructuring ideas proposed suggest that the hardest aspect of arriving at a restructuring plan is agreeing on the criteria that should guide comparison of options. Arriving at a re-configuration of Centers that would be acceptable to a large majority of CGIAR stakeholders is not an easy task, as the CDMT discovered in identifying possible clusters of Centers. Such criteria will need to emerge from the CGIAR’s agreed vision, mission, values, functions, and strategy—not to mention its future financing and resource allocation modalities.

Given these considerations, perhaps the easiest option to agree on is the “single board” option, which, in effect, defers the restructuring challenge to a new governing entity which would have authority to act on these matters.

Reforming Center and Challenge Program Governance

There has been a slow but steady improvement in the performance of the CGIAR Center Boards over the last 20 years. In a 1991 paper summarizing findings from the first round of External Management Reviews, I had noted that “of the thirteen recent management reviews of centers, in seven the overall performance of the board was judged to be “poor” or “uneven,” in five there was no clear conclusion on performance, and in one case the board was judged to be performing well.”⁶ Board weaknesses covered the entire spectrum of board functions. An examination of board performance through the annual Performance Measurement System now shows that a great majority of the boards are following practices that were largely weak or absent 17 years ago (such as systematic evaluation of the DG, self-assessment of the board, more disciplined approach to functions such as audit and nominations, conduct of board meetings, etc.)

The most comprehensive study of center governance in recent years was conducted by the Stripe Review Panel on governance in 2006. Although this panel also pointed to “uneven” performance by the boards, this unevenness reflected, in my opinion, variation around a higher mean performance than that in 1991. The Review made 31 recommendations—mostly on process. The CGIAR concurred with these and the Boards

⁵ With the exception of the (hopefully short-term) difficulty being experienced by CIAT.

⁶ Ozgediz, Selcuk, *Governance and Management of the CGIAR Centers*, CGIAR Study Paper No. 27, 1991.

diligently implemented them—except the recommendation on reducing the size of the boards (to 9-11). A few boards (CIMMYT and WorldFish among them) were able to go even further (reducing Board size to 7 members), but others found difficult to do so politically and otherwise.

On the important question of accountability of Boards, the Panel differentiated among three levels of stakeholders: first, the CGIAR (shareholders), second, NARS, and third, poor farmers in developing countries. It also stressed the importance of transparency (such as by publishing performance indicators in the Center's annual report), the board's need for full information, and the mechanisms (such as MTPs and external reviews) the System employs to reinforce accountability.

The Stripe Review drew attention to the need to further reform Center governance and kicked off introspective examinations by the Centers. The Alliance Board and the Executive Council followed up implementation of recommendations diligently. Orientation Programs for new Board members reinforced the reforms that had been put in place.

There were two other initiatives that fueled the reform trend.

The first was a short note published as an Annex to the 2005 CIMMYT EPMP drafted by the panel member working on questions of governance.⁷ The note argued that CG Centers should rethink the role of the Board and that the Board should oversee the functioning of the entire enterprise and focus on matters that are most important for the Center's viability and performance, such as strategic direction, stewardship of finances, ensuring competent management, etc. This implies a shift from supervising primarily the research program. The paper also called for smaller, more strategic boards that can meet frequently (with shorter face-to-face or virtual meetings), and, if necessary getting help from an advisory committee on scientific and technical matters.

The note was instrumental in initiating change in the recommended direction in CIMMYT and a few other centers, although several found kicking off old habits too difficult.

A second initiative was the overhaul of the CGIAR's 1997 Board Guidelines by the CGIAR Secretariat and the Alliance Board—based on the results of the Stripe Review and best practice in corporate governance in non-profit organizations worldwide. The new guidelines benefited from both external expert advice and internal scrutiny. The final version, endorsed by the CGIAR, reflects the current "CGIAR policy" *vis-à-vis* the operations of Center Boards.

⁷ "Rethinking Governance in CGIAR Centers" by Maureen Robinson, Appendix VII of the 2005 CIMMYT EPMP.

Governance of Challenge Programs

Governance questions pose a greater challenge to the CPs than the Centers, primarily because the Centers have legal personality but the CPs do not. Each Center's incorporation documents spell out the authority of the Board. The CPs, on the other hand, function as un-incorporated joint ventures and rely on the legal personality of a host institution to facilitate the conduct of their activities.

To complicate matters, at the start of the CP initiative the CGIAR agreed to leave each CP free to set up its own governance mechanism. As these were "pilot" programs, this arrangement would allow the CG to learn from the experiences of different CPs on governance and, based on that, establish guidelines similar to those for the Center Boards.

A study conducted in 2004, a few years after the start of the pilot CPs, showed that there were as many different governance models as there is CPs. In addition to the need for common guidelines for CPs, the "lessons learned" paper drew attention to two key governance issues:

- Links between CP governance bodies and host Centers; and,
- Lines of accountability to investors.

The first issue varied across the pilot CPs that are hosted by CGIAR Centers, especially in terms of the "length of the arm" in the expected arms-length-distance between the CP and the host Center. The second issue was never addressed or clarified systematically. The CPs, as CGIAR Programs, were expected to be accountable and "report" to the CGIAR. The means used were progress reports to ExCo and the CGIAR by the CPs and, like in the case of the Centers, MTPs and External Reviews.

The last of these, external reviews, led to a convergence of views on CP governance. The Water and Food and Generation CP reviews both recommended/supported the establishment of an "independent board" to oversee operations—paralleling the practice of the HarvestPlus CP and that of the Centers.

A board made up primarily of outsiders would eliminate most conflict of interest issues that emerge from having the participating members of the consortium manage the CP operation. But this would add another body to the already complicated governance structure of CPs. The two issues identified in 2002 (relations with the host institution and accountability to the CGIAR) would still need to be sorted out under these new arrangements.

Concluding Comments on Center and CP Governance

When there is a failure in the System, for whatever reason, it is always the Board that gets the blame. This is as it should be, because "the buck stops" at the highest body responsible for the institution. The few performance failures that took place in the System recently (ISNAR, CIMMYT, CIAT) have served as "wake-up calls" to the concerned and other Centers in the CGIAR. In all cases, the Boards have acted quite

responsibly (although after the fact) and took appropriate action to address the performance problem experienced. As a result, governance in the Centers is stronger today than it was a decade or two ago.

After 37 years of existence, the Center Boards have reached a level of maturity in terms of carrying out their governance functions. All boards are aware that, to perform well, they need (1) bring on board the best people who have the needed competence, who are provided (2) the right information in a timely manner, and who also have (3) the time needed to address (4) key strategic issues faced by the Center. This applies to the Centers as well as the CPs.

The two most important governance issues faced at the Center and CP level relate not to internal oversight questions, but to how each Center or CP relates to the rest of the System. The two governance issues that have been raised repeatedly since the establishment of the CGIAR are:

- the Center's accountability to the CGIAR, and,
- how the Centers collectively operate as a system.

These issues are valid even if the organizational structure of the "operating arm" of the CGIAR remains the same. Could the composition of the Boards (both Centers and CPs) be modified to strengthen their accountability to the CGIAR? What reforms could be taken, in cooperation with the Alliance, to ensure greater harmony in the procedures and operations of all units and programs? These are the type of questions that will need to be addressed during the Change Management initiative.

Closing Comments

In this paper I tried to provide an evolutionary picture of how governance in the CGIAR has changed over the last 20 years and how the System has reacted to suggestions of reform over this period. The picture I have drawn is clearly as seen from a personal lens. For this reason, I invite the readers to offer their own perspective on this evolution and the issues that need addressing.

The approach I have taken, that of examining CGIAR governance, organizational structure, and Center/CP governance separately, has advantages as well as disadvantages. The key advantage is that it allows a focused analysis of governance questions. The major disadvantage is that the approach overlooks the relations between the three perspectives. I close this note with some of the key questions on the interaction between the levels examined that remain to be answered:

1. If the CGIAR adopts a centralized organization structure, with a single board, how would the board be appointed? Who would the Board be accountable to? How would this be enforced? What would be the make-up of the Board? How much time would members need to spend on CGIAR?
2. If there were a single board, would there be need for separate smaller boards (like a managing board) for each entity under the single board?

3. Same questions if the CGIAR were to adopt a divisionalized (or cluster) structure.
4. How would the clusters be formed under a divisionalized structure? What criteria would be used?
5. What happens to Centers if the CGIAR decides to support programs? How long a transition is needed to shift completely to a program-based structure? Would the programs have separate governing bodies? Would there be a single Board?
6. If the CGIAR were to remain as an informal body, how would it ensure that its decisions are carried out by the “operating arm” of the System. Conversely, if the CGIAR were to become a legal entity, would the “operating arm” be a part of the same legal entity?
7. Would it be possible to consolidate the support mechanisms for the CGIAR, the Science Council and the Centers if CGIAR operations were to be managed through a single Board? Could one have a single “corporate office” for the System?

Table 1. Reforming CGIAR's Governance—Past Recommendations and CGIAR Actions

Source of the Recommendation and Reason for the Study	Key Recommendations on CGIAR Governance	CGIAR Action	Reasons for the Action	Comments
<p>CGIAR WG on Deliberation and Decision Making Processes (Herdt Panel—1992) <i>Reason:</i> Dissatisfaction of Members and Centers with CGIAR's processes</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Establish a CGIAR committee on Finance 2. Establish a CGIAR committee on Evaluation 	<p>Largely agreed. Two standing committees of CGIAR were formed: Oversight Committee and Finance Committee.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To facilitate decision making by the CGIAR • Oversight Committee with a broader mandate than evaluation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This is the first time CGIAR established standing committees of membership
<p>Oversight Committee Paper on "CGIAR's Governance and Organization: Is There Need for Change?" (1994) <i>Reason:</i> Felt need by OC to Explore options for change.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Suggests moving towards centralized decision-making (through an Executive Committee) 2. Recommends a fuller study of governance, provides TOR 	<p>Largely ignored. Considered as "food for thought" Follow-up study commissioned by the Chair to a Panel (see below)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New Chair, with his own vision on the CGIAR. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This is a "think piece: laying out options and suggesting directions • Outlines CGIAR's governance principles • The overall typology of reform options still valid today.
<p>Study Panel on the CGIAR's Long-Term Governance and Financing Structure (Winkel Panel, 1994) <i>Reason:</i> Pressure by OC, supported by the CG Chair.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. CGIAR should not seek to be established as an int'l org. 2. CGIAR should organize a Global Forum on Agr. Res. 3. Replace MTM with executive session of CG Members 4. Strengthen impact assessment and performance measurement 	<p>Largely agreed (at the Lucerne Meeting in 1995) The arrangements for the MTM were not modified</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Chair's vision (especially on the Global Forum) paralleled the recommendations of the Panel. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There was no appetite for large scale change in System governance.

Reforming CGIAR Governance—Past Recommendations and Actions (p 2)

Source of the Recommendation and Reason for the Study	Key Recommendations on CGIAR Governance	CGIAR Action	Reasons for the Action	Comments
<p>Lucerne Declaration and Action Program (endorsed at the Ministerial-Level CGIAR Meeting Held in Lucerne in 1995)</p> <p><i>Reason:</i> To initiate a CGIAR renewal program that is endorsed at the highest level.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. CGIAR should not be established as an international organization. 2. Oversight and Finance Committees should become part of a Steering Committee. 3. Establish an independent evaluation function. 4. Partnership Committees (with the Private Sector and with NGOs) should be established. 	<p>These were executive decisions by the CGIAR.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To broaden and strengthen partnerships. • To generate focal point for promoting and expanding impact assessment. • To maintain the informal status of the CGIAR 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishment of a Steering Committee (which was to be chaired by the CG Chair) was partly aimed at reducing the influence of OC and FC. • The new committees formed increased organizational complexity of the CGIAR.
<p>Third System Review (1998)</p> <p><i>Reason:</i> Pressure from the membership to have a System review (the last having been done in 1981).</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. CGIAR should be incorporated as a public non-profit organization with a central board and full time chair. 	<p>Politely rejected.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The case was not made strongly. • Members not willing to give up their sovereignty. • Legal obstacles to participating in formal decision making by Members 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A top-down approach was used to generate change. • The recommendation was not sufficiently vetted with the stakeholders.
<p>Federation of Centers (proposal by CBC/CDC – 2000)</p> <p><i>Reasons:</i> To initiate collective action; to pre-empt top-down restructuring action by the CG.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Establishing a Federation of Centers as a legal entity, with a board and a Federation Office. 	<p>Deferred to further review by a “Synthesis Group” along with other proposals.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some Members saw a conflict of interest if Centers were to carry out functions traditionally carried out by TAC and the Secretariat. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The proposal was not sufficiently vetted and was misunderstood by many.

Reforming CGIAR Governance—Past Recommendations and Actions (p 3)

Source of the Recommendation and Reason for the Study	Key Recommendations on CGIAR Governance	CGIAR Action	Reasons for the Action	Comments
<p>Change Design and Management Team (CDMT – 2001)</p> <p><i>Reason:</i> Design change in agreed areas, considering all proposals on the table.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Transform TAC into a Science Council 2. Establish ExCo as a “shareholder” committee 3. Have one AGM (no MTM) 4. Establish a virtual “System Office” 	<p>Agreed with the governance recommendations, except the establishment of ExCo as a “shareholder” committee (it was made a “stakeholder” committee.)</p>	<p>NGO Committee representatives and some CG Members lobbied for a more inclusive Executive Council, although at the expense of clouding accountabilities.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The AGM and ExCo decisions, followed by adopting a Charter, led to new business practices and functional responsibilities.
<p>OED Meta Evaluation (2003)</p> <p><i>Reason:</i> WB requirement to have an evaluation three years after the Third System Review.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Need fundamental reform in the management of the CG. 2. Establish strong SC. 3. Develop Charter. 4. Consider establishing all or part of the CG as legal entity 5. Revisit CG’s founding principles. 	<p>Developed Charter.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recommendations were to the World Bank’s Board. • There were lots of criticisms, without concrete recommendations about what the CG should do. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Several themes, such as questioning the continuing appropriateness of governance principles were useful reminders. • The evaluation was more like a commentary on the CGIAR.

Table 2. CGIAR's Organizational Structure—Past Recommendations and Actions

Source of the Recommendation and Reason for the study	Key Recommendations on Organizational Structure	CGIAR Action	Reasons for the Action or Inaction	Comments
CG TF on Banana & Plantain Research CG WG on Livestock Research <i>Reasons:</i> Avoid duplication, streamline organization, ensure financial viability	1. Maintain INIBAP as network with reconstituted BOT responsible also for a <i>musa</i> germplasm consortium. 2. Create single international livestock center	Agreed with the <u>TAC recommendation</u> to bring INIBAP under the administrative umbrella of IPGRI. Agreed with WG to create a single livestock center	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Streamline CGIAR's organization in the face of declining resources Discomfort to keep a small network (\$3 m/yr) as a separate independent center. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> These decisions led to the first (and only) mergers of centers in the CGIAR. The INIBAP decision went against the Task Force's recommendation.
A Vision for the CGIAR (Conway Panel report, 1994) <i>Reason:</i> Absence of a clear vision statement for the CG.	1. Change to a program-based approach (Global Programs and Regional Action Prog.) 2. Three types of Global Progr: (a) long-term, center based; (b) multi-center; (c) collaborative strategic research. 2. Subsidiarity, partnership and transfer (involvement of NARS) as key principles.	Agreed with the vision statement and the vision (<i>Sustainable agriculture for a food-secure world</i>) and a number of governance recommendations. No action taken on the shift to a programmatic approach.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lucerne introduced a number of important changes in governance. Tackling the shift to a programmatic approach would be too much to absorb. Programmatic approach was seen as something too far away in the future. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The CGIAR did not focus on the organizational recommendations of the Conway Panel. The new Chair's interest was bringing stability to the System—not further disruption.
Oversight Committee Paper on "CGIAR's Governance and Organization: Is There Need for Change?" (1994) <i>Reason:</i> Felt need by OC to Explore options for change.	1. Suggests moving towards a centralized structure in the long-term, either through a <i>single board</i> managing all 15 centers or a <i>divisionalized structure</i> . 2. Recommends a fuller study of governance, provides TOR	Largely ignored. Considered as "food for thought." Follow-up study commissioned, which did not address organizational structure issues.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The new Chair's interest was bringing stability to the System—not further disruption. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The typology of structural options is still relevant today.

Table 2. CGIAR's Organizational Structure—Past Recommendations and Actions (p. 2)

Source of the Recommendation and Reason for the study	Key Recommendations on Organizational Structure	CGIAR Action	Reasons for the Action or Inaction	Comments
<p>Third System Review (1998)</p> <p><i>Reason:</i> Pressure from the membership to have a System review (the last having been done in 1981).</p>	<p>1. None.</p> <p>2. Recognizes the need for change and suggests a more detailed management review should be conducted.</p>	None.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CGIAR acted only on the recommendations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not addressing the issue was a failure of the review panel.
<p>Electronic Conference on CGIAR Governance, Organization and Structure – Final Synthesis (Berdegue, 2000)</p> <p><i>Reason:</i> Part of new vision study (as follow-up to the System Review) led by TAC</p>	<p>1. Options suggested include:</p> <p>a. reorganize along lines of <i>global and regional centers</i></p> <p>b. establish <i>single board</i> to manage all centers</p> <p>c. fund <i>programs</i> or <i>virtual institutes</i> open to participation by all</p> <p>d. <i>merge</i> or <i>consolidate</i> existing centers</p>	None.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The paper was part of a larger effort and did not have clear recommendations to act on 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The electronic conference reflected the diversity of views on structure. It also highlighted that germplasm-based activities have different organizational requirements from NRM-based activities.
<p>Federation of Centers (proposal by CBC/CDC – 2000)</p> <p><i>Reasons:</i> To initiate collective action; to pre-empt top-down restructuring action by the CG.</p>	<p>1. Establishing a Federation of Centers as a legal entity, with a board and a Federation Office.</p>	Deferred to further review by a “Synthesis Group” along with other proposals.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A Federation Board without powers could not integrate efforts. • The key is how much authority is delegated by each center to the Federation Board.

Table 2. CGIAR's Organizational Structure—Past Recommendations and Actions (p. 3)

Source of the Recommendation and Reason for the study	Key Recommendations on Organizational Structure	CGIAR Action	Reasons for the Action or Inaction	Comments
CGIAR 2010 Vision and Strategy—Governance, Organization and Structure: Report of the Synthesis Group (2000) <i>Reason:</i> To integrate existing proposals on governance and structure	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Consider establishing a Federation jointly by Members and Centers. 2. Form a task force to study organizational structure of the centers 	The idea of a Federation was not supported. A Change Design and Management Team was formed.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Potential conflict of interest (or lack of firewall) between donor support and center support functions. • The task was passed on to CDMT to examine. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Synthesis Group saw many advantages in promoting collective action by the Centers. • Like the Third System Review, it, too passed the buck on structure to another group.
Change Design and Management Team (CDMT – 2001) <i>Reason:</i> Design change in agreed areas, considering all proposals on the table.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. CGIAR should adopt an evolutionary restructuring approach. 2. CGIAR should set aside funds to encourage voluntary restructuring. 	Agreed with both. Invited centers to propose joint proposals for restructuring.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The CDMT argument (that the move to a programmatic approach thru CPs would lead to center mergers or formation of clusters) was worth testing. • CG (or anyone else) had no agreed criteria that could be used in a restructuring. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • With two Center Directors as its members, the composition of CDMT was not conducive to making specific recommendations on restructuring, although there was strong support to move towards a <i>cluster approach</i>.
OED Meta Evaluation (2003) <i>Reason:</i> WB requirement to have an evaluation three years after the Third System Review.	Increase the efficiency of the System through appropriate consolidation, decentralization, streamlining, and absorption of marginally effective Centers, based on a management review.	No action by the CGIAR on this recommendation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recommendations were to the World Bank's Board. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Another instance of “passing the buck” when it came to restructuring.

Table 2. CGIAR's Organizational Structure—Past Recommendations and Actions (p. 4)

Source of the Recommendation and Reason for the study	Key Recommendations on Organizational Structure	CGIAR Action	Reasons for the Action or Inaction	Comments
<p>Restructuring ISNAR: Report of the CGIAR Team (2003)</p> <p><i>Reason:</i> To follow-up the EPMR of ISNAR, which recommended restructuring the Center.</p>	<p>1. ISNAR should not remain as a free standing CGIAR Center.</p> <p>2. A restructured ISNAR Program should be operated under IFPRI governance.</p>	<p>Requested the Board of ISNAR to dissolve the Center.</p> <p>Requested the Boards of ISNAR and IFPRI to carry out the transfer of the governance of the ISNAR Program</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ExCo paved the way and built the consensus needed for the tough decision. • Members, led by the WB, showed willingness to finance the closure and transition costs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The first time in history the CGIAR closed a center (and demonstrated it can act decisively.) • Having the Chair of the ISNAR Board as member of the Restructuring Team helped to reduce resistance from the Center.
<p>Report of the CGIAR SSA Task Forces (2005)</p> <p><i>Reason:</i> CGIAR activities in SSA are disjointed. Two Task Forces were formed to examine programmatic and structural alignment of all CGIAR activities, starting with SSA.</p>	<p>1. Agree in principle to consolidate all CGIAR Centers and activities into one global corporate entity.</p> <p>2. As a first step towards this, consolidate all Centers headquartered in SSA into two entities: one in West and Central Africa, the other in East and Southern Africa.</p> <p>3. Request IITA and WARDA to form a single Board</p> <p>4. Establish a CGIAR entity in ESA using a corporate Board model, with ICRAF and ILRI as its initial constituent units.</p>	<p>CGIAR did not act on the “one global corporate entity” recommendation.</p> <p>Asked Centers and NARS to proceed with programmatic alignment in the two sub-regions.</p> <p>Asked IITA and WARDA to work towards common board membership.</p> <p>Asked all centers concerned to align their corporate services.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The TFs’ mandate was seen limited only to SSA; therefore the “one global corporate entity” was not discussed. • The logic for the ESA recommendation was not supported because ILRI and ICRAF do different kinds of research. • When structural alignment proved difficult to agree on, the focus shifted to corporate services alignment (easier to implement). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Members were reluctant to endorse recommendations that provided only a partial solution (SSA only), w/o knowing how the rest of the System would be structured. • The Centers involved were not supportive of the solution offered. • The exercise showed the difficulty of finding structural solution to the blending of global and regional activities.

Table 3. Center and Challenge Program Governance—Past Recommendations and Actions

Source of the Recommendation and Reason for the study	Key Recommendations on Center or CP Governance	CGIAR Action	Reasons for the Action or Inaction	Comments
<p>Stripe Review of Corporate Governance of CGIAR Centers (2006)</p> <p><i>Reason:</i> Compare CG Center governance practices with best practice outside the CG</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Uneven performance across CG Center boards 2. Recommended board size: 9-11, with no more than one host country rep and two CG nominees and at least two members with finance exp. 3. More frequent board meetings. 4. Many recommendations on board procedures. 	<p>Asked the Center Boards to implement the recommendations and to report to ExCo on progress in implementing the recommendations.</p> <p>Center Boards reported that most of the recommendations were implemented.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Boards disagreed with the recommendations on Board size and host country reps. • The Alliance Board and CG Sec. agreed to have the CGIAR Board guidelines revised, taking into account the stripe review rec's and best practice on corporate governance. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The stripe review kicked off a board reform effort in the CGIAR.
<p>Rethinking Governance in CGIAR Centers (Appendix VII, CIMMYT EPMR, 2005)</p> <p><i>Reason:</i> Think piece on CGIAR Center governance issues prompted by the CIMMYT situation.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Redefine the Board's role towards oversight and stewardship of strategy and finance. 2. Smaller, more strategic boards (7-10 members). 3. More frequent, shorter, strategic meetings. 4. Appoint a Scientific Advisory Committee, if necessary. 	<p>CGIAR endorsed the specific recommendations on CIMMYT's governance.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIMMYT followed through with a governance reform agenda, incorporating most of the recommendations in this think piece. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The think piece prompted action not only at CIMMYT, but also at other Centers (such as WorldFish).

Table 3. Center and Challenge Program Governance—Past Recommendations and Actions (p. 2)

Source of the Recommendation and Reason for the study	Key Recommendations on Center or CP Governance	CGIAR Action	Reasons for the Action or Inaction	Comments
<p>CGIAR Guidelines on Center Governance – Roles, Responsibilities and Accountability of Center Boards (2007)</p> <p><i>Reason:</i> The previous guides were outdated (10 years old); new thinking and issues on corporate governance</p>	<p>Five principles of corporate governance for the CGIAR:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Focus on purpose 2. Ensure accountability 3. Understand stakeholder perspectives 4. Ensure transparency 5. Commit to effective gov. <p>Six responsibilities for CGIAR boards are described</p> <p>Self-assessment checklist is provided.</p>	<p>Endorsed the guidelines, replacing the 1997 board guidelines.</p> <p>The Center boards began implementing them.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Alliance Board was closely involved in reviewing successive drafts and endorsed the final version before it was submitted to the CGIAR. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Two external experts on non-profit governance served as advisor in the preparation of the guidelines. • The governance principles advocated parallel similar principles used for corporate boards by OECD. • A companion volume includes several reference materials the boards could use (such as assessment forms)
<p>Synthesis of Lessons Learned from Initial Implementation of CGIAR Challenge Programs (2004)</p> <p><i>Reason:</i> To draw lessons from the pilot CPs in order to improve CP operations, including governance</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Each CP uses a different governance model 2. Flexibility is good, but common governance parameters for CPs should be developed. 3. Links between CP governance bodies and host centers should be clarified 4. Lines of accountability to investors should be clarified. 	<p>None. The findings and recommendations of the paper were presented to the CGIAR for information. There was no discussion.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of agreed follow-up actions diminished the impact of the paper. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CGIAR followed a learning-by-doing approach in CP governance, allowing experimentation. • Lessons learned could have been used to initiate changes earlier. (They are being done now.)

Table 3. Center and Challenge Program Governance—Past Recommendations and Actions (p. 3)

Source of the Recommendation and Reason for the study	Key Recommendations on Center or CP Governance	CGIAR Action	Reasons for the Action or Inaction	Comments
External Review of Challenge Program on Water and Food (2007)	<p>Thorough reform of CPWF is needed.</p> <p>CPFW should be led by a small, independent board, supported by a Scientific Advisory Committee and an Audit Committee.</p>	<p>Agreed with the recommendations</p> <p>CPFW implementing the recommendation (a 9-person board is being set up.)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The initial governance model (where consortium partners governed jointly) did not work. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CPWF Research Agenda and Implementation Plan for Phase 2 (2208) has a useful matrix showing the roles of various actors in CPWF governance.
Report of the First External Review of the Generation Challenge Program (2008)	<p>Unincorporated joint venture of 18 consortium partners led by a Program Steering Com.</p> <p>PSC received mixed ratings on governance functions.</p> <p>Review endorses CP decision to set up an independent executive board.</p>	<p>Science Council agreed with the recommendation for an executive board.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The change to an executive board was made by GCP itself, therefore inaction is unlikely. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Follows the trend from CPFW and Harvest Plus' existing practice. • (Note that all three CP external review panels had the same expert examining governance.)